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Comments
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS:
DAMAGES RECOVERABLE FOR AN ILLEGAL
TYING ARRANGEMENT
INTRODUCTION
With the continued expansion of our nation's economy during
the past several decades, business entrepeneurs have employed a
variety of practices to increase their share of the market at a mini-
mum of expense. One of the most prevalent devices, especially in
the area of franchising,1 has been the use of the so-called tying ar-
rangement. Until recently, any violation of the Sherman Act 2 or
the Clayton Act 3 which these practices might have occasioned were
prosecuted primarily by the government. However, with a develop-
ing sophistication of the trial bar a greater number of private en-
forcement suits have been initiated to help discipline our burgeon-
ing business community.
Although there has been an abundance of private antitrust
litigation in recent years, suprisingly little of it has concentrated on
1. Although a tying arrangement is not unique to franchising, this
method of business organization is particularly conducive to the establish-
ment of a tie-in. Therefore, a basic understanding of the functioning of a
franchise agreement is desirable.
Initially it is important to note that franchising is not a separate in-
dustry. Rather it is a method of business organization applicable to a
great number of industries, by which the franchisor can expand his method
of distribution vertically, while avoiding the often prohibitive capital out-
lays required for more traditional expansion techniques.
An excellent description of the general outlines of a franchise agree-
ment is contained in J. McCord, The Franchising Sourcebook 4-5 (Com-
mercial Law and Practice Sourcebook Series No. 2, 1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
the problem of tie-ins or, more importantly, what damages are
recoverable once the illegal arrangement has been established.
In an effort to put this area into focus, this Comment will ex-
amine several aspects of private enforcement of the federal pro-
hibitions against tie-ins. Initially, the article will explore what
constitutes a tie-in and what factors make certain tie-in's violative
of the antitrust laws. Thereafter, the author will discuss the issue
of standing to maintain suit under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
4
Finally, the major portion of the comment will examine in detail
what damages, if any, may be recovered once the illegal tying ar-
rangement has been demonstrated.
ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN TIE-IN LITIGATION
A. Definition of a Tying Arrangement
The Supreme Court has defined a tie-in as:
An agreement by a party to sell one product (the tying
product) but only on the condition that the buyer also pur-
chase a different or tied product or at least agrees that he
will not purchase that product from any other supplier.5
However, a tying arrangement may be shown to exist even where
it is not imposed by means of an express agreement. For example,
a gasoline dealer may contract to buy 4,000 gallons of gasoline every
month from his supplier. But, in addition, it is understood by both
parties that the dealer must also purchase fifteen sets of tires from
this same supplier every month if he is continue to receive his sup-
ply of gasoline. The presence of the tie-in may be demonstrated by
this extrinsic course of conduct supplementing the written con-
tract.6
Congress has frowned on such practice because competition is
stifled in several ways. First, the purchaser is compelled to buy
the tied product not because the supplier is offering him better
terms but merely because the supplier has enough economic power
in the tying product market to demand such compliance.7 In ad-
4. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
5. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). The
facts of this case indicate that in 1864 and 1870 Congress granted the
predecessor of the Northern Pacific Railway Co. approximately forty
million acres of land in several Northwestern States and Territories to fa-
cilitate its construction of a railroad line from Lake Superior to Puget
Sound. By 1949 the Railroad had sold about 37,000,000 acres of its holdings
but had reserved mineral rights in 6,500,000 of those acres. In a large num-
ber of its sales contracts and most of its lease agreements the plaintiff had
inserted preferential routing clauses which compelled the grantee or lessee
to ship over its lines all commodities produced or manufactured on the
land provided that its rates were equal to those of competing carriers. There
were other means of transportation, including two additional rail lines,
by which these goods could have been shipped.
6. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 286 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1960).




dition, competing suppliers of the tied product are foreclosed
from that part of the market which is subject to the tying arrange-
ment.8  Moreover, the courts have found that the existence of a
tie-in can rarely be justified because, "they serve hardly any pur-
pose beyond the suppression of competition."9  As a result, tie-ins
have been held illegal under both Section 3 of the Clayton Act'0 and
Section 1 of the Sherman Act." The Clayton Act concerns itself
with tie-ins involving commodities.' 2 Services and other types of
property subject to tying arrangements are dealt with in the Sher-
man Act.
B. Proving an Illegal Tie-In
The initial problem presented in every attempt to prove an
illegal tie-in is: does the arrangement actually involve two dis-
tinct products and require that one, the tying product, may not be
purchased unless the tied product is also bought.1 Since almost
all goods are made up of component parts this test is often quite
difficult to apply. It is obvious, for example, that selling an
automobile and the accompanying windshield as one product does
not involve a tie-in. While it is true that each product may
be sold separately, selling both together as a unit does not involve
the coercion and market foreclosure that the prohibition against
tie-ins is designed to eliminate.
8. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
9. Standard Oil and Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 305-06 (1949).
10. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
* . . to lease or make a sale . . .on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or
deal in the goods, . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or
such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), states, "Every
contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations is declared to be illegal." However, this section of the statute has
been interpreted so as to proscribe only those restraints which are consid-
ered unreasonable. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. Commodity as used here means: "any movable or tangible thing
that is produced or used as the subject of barter or sale." People v. Ep-
stean, 102 Misc. 476, 170 N.Y.S. 68, 79 (Ct. of Gen. Sessions 1918).
13. Mr. Justice Clark stated in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 613-14 (1952), "The common core of the un-
lawful tying arrangements is the forced purchase of a second distinct
commodity with the desired purchase of a dominant tying product re-
sulting in economic harm to competition in the tied market."
On the other hand, the test becomes much more difficult to
apply when the two products involved are the car and the factory
installed radio. An initial reaction to this combination might be
that there is obviously no tying arrangement involved here either.
Yet, upon closer examination, it appears that all the definitional
factors are present. If buyers want a radio (which is always listed
as an option) in their new car they must take the one offered
to them by the manufacturer. In addition, a substantial share of
the market is closed to those independent suppliers who specialize
in producing and marketing car electronics including radios.
14
The point to be made is that the decision as to whether a tie-in
exists should not rest solely on a determination of whether two
separate products are involved. Rather, in making a determination,
the courts take into account those aspects of tying arrange-
ments which prompted Congress to declare them illegal. If it ap-
pears that a particular combination of goods might indeed sub-
stantially lessen competition and there is some evidence that sep-
arate products are involved (for example that several other com-
panies produce and market the tied product) the court should allow
the action to proceed. If the tie-in does not fall within the rule of
per se illegality, the plaintiff must still prove that the general stand-
ards of the antitrust laws have been violated and the defendant
always has an opportunity to justify this combination of goods.15
C. The Doctrine of Per Se Illegality
Once the plaintiff proves that a tying arrangement does exist
he may be able to avail himself of the doctrine of per se illegality.
The basis for the doctrine was stated by Mr. Justice Black in
Northern Pacific Railroad v. United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which be-
cause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate in-
quiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use.'6
Originally, different standards were applicable to invoke this pre-
sumption of illegality depending upon which antitrust law the ac-
tion was based. According to the decision in Times-Picayune v.
United States" the presumption would arise under the Clayton
14. Although it is doubtful that courts would condemn this as an
illegal tying arrangement for reasons listed above, the difficulty in deter-
mining what are separate products is by no means imaginary. Recently
the Ninth Circuit held that a trademark was a distinct tying item where
the franchisees were required to purchase all equipment associated with
the business from the franchisor. Siegal v. Chicken Delight Inc., 448
F.2d 43, 47-49 (9th Cir. 1971).
15. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
16. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17. 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
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Act18 if the seller enjoyed a monopolistic position in the tying
product market or if a substantial amount of competition was sup-
pressed in the market of the tied product. In order for this doc-
trine to come into play under a Sherman Act 9 violation, the court
held that both of the above conditions had to be met.
20
However, in a later case,2 ' the Supreme Court in dealing with
a Sherman Act violation stated that tie-ins were presumed illegal
when (1) the seller enjoys sufficient economic power with respect
to the tying product to appreciably restrain trade in the tied prod-
uct market and (2) a not insubstantial amount of competition is af-
fected. The important difference between this test and the first one
enunciated2 2 is that the requirement of a "monopolistic position"
has been dropped. Since, realistically, a tie-in cannot be imposed
unless the seller enjoys some leverage in the tying product market
and, in addition, the arrangement will not be considered illegal un-
less a fair amount of interstate competition is affected, it appears
as if the test for per se illegality under both statutes has become
identical.
The Supreme Court has been quite liberal in determining what
elements will satisfy the first half of this test. Although it is im-
possible to state with precision what constitutes sufficient econ-
omic power over the tying product to render the tie-in illegal, it is
clear that economic dominance is not a prerequisite. 23 In its most
recent statement on the subject 24 the Court seemed to indicate
that if a plaintiff merely showed a tie-in was successfully imposed
on an "appreciable number of buyers"2 5 within the market, this
would demonstrate sufficient economic power notwithstanding the
fact that the seller may only have leverage in a relatively small
share of the tying product market.28
18. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
20. Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
21. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).
22. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
23. In United States v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962), the court
stated, "even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic
power may be inferred from the tying products desirability to consumers or
from uniqueness in its attributes."
24. Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 497
(1969).
25. Id. at 504.
26. This same rationale applies to patented or copyrighted tying
products. By its very nature a patent or a copyright gives the owner a
lawful monopoly over the goods in question and any attempt to extend
this monopoly to other goods via a tying arrangement is considered to be
per se illegal. United States v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
The second half of the test was announced in International
Salt Co. v. United States27 where $500,000 of interstate commerce
was affected by the tying arrangement. Since then, in an effort
to stimulate private antitrust suits, the Court has stated:
For the purposes of determining whether the amount of
commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant pro-
hibition of the practice, . . . the relevant figure is the total
volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge,
not the portion of the total accounted for by the particu-
lar plaintiff who brings suit.28
As long as this figure is not "de minimis" 29 the courts will consider
the tie-in to affect a substantial amount of interstate commerce.
It is important to remember that the plaintiff does not have
to meet the above standards in order to prevail on the merits of
the case. These requirements are only necessary to bring into play
the doctrine of per se illegality. Once it has been determined that
the doctrine was properly invoked30 the arrangement is presumed
I 1- 1I.I:d1 W1lLIUU., i LLjLUI3. LL- _J Z .-U 4U -
nature of the anti-competitive practice and the plaintiff may pro-
ceed directly to the question of damages. However, even if the
plaintiff fails to satsify these standards it is not fatal to his case.
He may still prevail on the merits when he can prove, "on the
basis of a more thorough examination of the purposes and effects
of practices involved . . . ,"1 that the general standard of the anti-
trust laws have been violated.
Even if the tie-in is presumed to be illegal, the supplier still
has an opportunity to defend on the ground that the arrangement
serves a legitimate business purpose.3 2 The courts, however, have
not been receptive to such justifications and there are only a hand-
ful of decisions which recognize this as a valid defense.33
27. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
28. Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 497,
502i (1969).
29. Id. at 501. The amount of interstate commerce affected in this
case was worth $200,000.
30. The plaintiff must prove that the alleged violation is per se ille-
gal by a preponderance of the evidence. Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Cope-
land Refrigeration Corp., 463 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1086 (1972).
31. Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 497,
500 (1969).
32. Id. at 506.
33. The following reasons have been accepted by the courts as justify-
ing a tying arrangement. New Business: White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,
187 F. Supp. 545, 556-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567
(1961). Difficulty in detailing specifications for substitutes: Susser
v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir. 1964), stating:
Yet it seems clear that in compelling circumstances the protection
of good will, as embodied for example in a valuable trademark
may justify an otherwise invalid tying arrangement. But, '. . . the
only situation indeed, in which the protection of good will may
necessitate the use of tying clauses is where specifications for a
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There is, in addition, one other aid available to a plaintiff to
ease his burden in proving the existence of an antitrust violation.
Section 5 of the Clayton Act 34 makes a final judgment or decree
in any civil or criminal suit brought by the federal government
"prima facie" evidence of the illegality of the arrangement in a pri-
vate enforcement suit dealing with the same matters.35 The policy
behind the statute is, "to minimize the burdens of litigation for
injured private suitors by making available to them all matters
previously established by the government in antitrust actions."30
The only exception to the rule is the proviso which states that
the section does not apply if the judgment rendered in the federal
action was a consent judgment.3 7 However, at least four courts38
have determined that the only time this proviso is operative is when
the plea in the federal action was nolo contendere. All other pleas
whether acquiesced in or not render the violator prima facie liable
in a private action dealing with the same issues.
3 9
D. Standing to Sue
40
Private antitrust suits are not founded merely on the showing
substitute (the tied product) would be so detailed that they could
not practicably be supplied. Standard Oil Co. and Standard Sta-
tions v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).'
Big Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc. 2d 894, 315
N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. Supreme Ct. 1970). Preservation of Good Will: Stand-
ard Oil Co. and Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
Once the plaintiff has succeeded in proving that an illegal tying ar-
rangement exists, the defendant has the burden of proving that there is a
legitimate business reason for the tie-in. United States v. Jerrold Elec-
tronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 548 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 16a (1970), states:
A final judgment or decree ... rendered in any civil or crim-
inal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under
the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said
laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any
action or proceeding brought by any other party against such de-
fendant under said laws. . . . Provided, that this section shall not
apply to consent judgments.
35. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 484
(1968).
36. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568
(1951).
37. See note 34 supra.
38. Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 209 (8th Cir.
1967), and authorities cited therein.
39. Id. at 209-10.
40. For a comprehensive analysis of the standing to sue problem
see Comment, Standing Under Clayton Section 4: A Proverbial Mystery,
77 DicK L. REv. 73 (1972).
of an antitrust violation.41 In order to successfully prosecute pri-
vate antitrust litigation the plaintiff must allege that he has suf-
fered some injury42 as a result of the violation. While Section 4
of the Clayton Act 43 states that "any person" so injured may re-
cover treble damages, the courts have been reluctant to interpret
the section literally. Instead, feeling that such interpretation would
unloose a new flood of cases which the judiciary would be unable
to handle, the courts have developed some rather strict and compli-
cated requirements which the plaintiff must meet before he is con-
sidered to have standing under Section 4.
4 4
The first requirement that the plaintiff must meet is the neces-
sary causal connection 45 between the antitrust violation and the
injury suffered. Two tests have been developed to determine
whether the necessary causal connection exists. The first indi-
cates that if the plaintiff is the person against whom the conspiracy
was directed or if the plaintiff has a direct business connection with
the antitrust violator and he can establish a link between violation
and injury, the casual connection will have been demonstrated
and plaintiff will be granted standing to sue.46 The second test
developed by other jurisdictions, is somewhat broader in its scope.
If the plaintiff can establish he was within the business category
against which the conspiracy was directed and again can prove the
41. "In a private antitrust action liability and damages are not sep-
arate. . . . One cannot think of private liability for violation of the anti-
trust laws except in terms of impact and damage." Haverhill Gazette Co.
v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d 798, 802 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
931 (1964).
42. Injury has been defined as follows: "[a]n act or occurrence which
impairs the economic position of the plaintiff." Muskin Shoe Co. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 167 F. Supp. 106, 111 (D. Md. 1958).
43. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
fore in any district court of the United States in the district in
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
45. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). Comment,
Standing Under Clayton Section 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REV.
73, 74 (1972).
46. SCM v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969). Comment, Standing Under Clayton Section 4:
A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REv. 73, 76 (1972). This test is called
the direct injury rule and it is supported by the Second, Third, Sixth and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals. E.g., Harrison v. Paramount Pictures,
115 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1953), ajf'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1962); Nation-
wide Auto Appraiser Serv. v. Ass'n of C. & S. Co., 382 F.2d 925, 928 (10th
Cir. 1967). But cf., H.F.S. Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 110,
115-16 (D. Kan. 1972) (accepting both the target area and the directness
test); Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699, 702 (D.
Colo. 1970) (indicating both tests are incorrect).
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connection between violation and injury he will be granted standing
to sue.
4 1
However, these tests constitute only one element of the stand-
ing requirement. The second, the fact of injury, 48 is the bridge
between the standing requirement and the amount of damages
recoverable. Because, private antitrust suits do not rest merely on
a factual determination that a violation has occurred 49 the plaintiff
must prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence,50 that he
has actually been injured. This element does not determine what
damages are recoverable once the injury has been proven. It only
establishes that there is a compensable injury. The difference be-
tween these two concepts and the measure of proof necessary for
each was clearly stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Story Parch-
ment Company v. Paterson Parchment Paper Company:51
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent
of the damage, but there was none as to the fact of the
damage; and there is a clear distinction between the meas-
ure of proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner
had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof
necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule
which precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies
to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those which are definitely attributable to the wrong and
only uncertain in respect of their amount.
It is clear, therefore, that unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
some actual injury he will be denied standing to sue under Section
4.52 However, once the plaintiff establishes the fact of injury
he need not specify the exact amount in which he has been dam-
aged.5" Since there is a strong policy favoring the implementation
47. Karseal v. Richfield Oil Corp., 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959). Com-
ment, Standing Under Clayton Section 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DIcK.
L. REv. 73, 80 (1972). This is called the target area test and is supported
by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
See, e.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360
F.2d 414, 419 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); Dailey v. Quality
School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1967); Congress Building
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 1957); Sanitary Milk
Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 689 (8th Cir. 1966).
48. Comment, Standing Under Clayton Section 4: A Proverbial
Mystery, 77 DIcK. L. REv. 73, 89 (1972).
49. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
50. Clark Marine Corp. v. Cargill, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La.
1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 1011 (1966).
51. 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1930).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
53. Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 578-79
(10th Cir. 1961).
of private treble damage suits,5 4 once the plaintiff has proved the
fact of injury the amount of his damage need only be proved with
reasonable certainty.56
Thus, before the issue of damages ever comes to the fore in
private antitrust litigation the plaintiff must plead and prove
the existence of a violation,56 the causal connection between the
violation and the injury5 7 and the fact that some injury has been
sustained. 58 Only at this juncture may the plaintiff begin to liti-
gate the question of the amount of his recovery.
DAM GES 59
Once having successfully satisfied the criteria for initiating a
suit the litigant may now proceed to prove what damages he has
suffered as a result of the illegal tying arrangement. There are
those who are injured because they are unwillingly involved in the
tie-in. 60 There are others who are damaged because they are ex-
cluded from selling goods in the market which the tying arrange-
ment encompasses."' Accordingly the remainder of the article will
examine the damages recoverable by each of these groups.
A. Plaintiffs Involved in a Tying Arrangement: Overcharge as
Measure of Damage
Traditionally, a party suing to recover treble damages6 2 has
been permitted to recover for: (1) loss of profits that could have
been earned in a freely competitive market; 63 (2) increased cost of
doing business 64 and (3) the decrease in value of investment in tan-
54. United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1964). Atlantic City
Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 226 F. Supp. 59, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
aff'd, 337 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1964), where the court stated:
The most significant consideration is the strong policy in favor of
private treble damage actions, which are intended not only to com-
pensate those injured by violations of the antitrust laws, but also
to function as an independent method of enforcing antitrust policy.
55. Kidd v. Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 497, 498-99 (6th Cir. 1961);
Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho
1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
56. Glenn Coal v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1934).
57. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
59. It should be noted that a plaintiff may recover damages for all
injuries caused by the antitrust violations prior to the filing of the action
and conversely a plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for injury re-
sulting from wrongful acts committed subsequent to the filing of the action.
Flinkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 394 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
60. See notes 62-98 and accompanying text infra.
61. See notes 144-165 and accompanying text infra.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
63. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (Sherman
Act violation); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555 (1931) (Sherman Act violation); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (Clayton Act violation).
64. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (Sherman Act violation);
Chattanooga Foundary & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (Sher-
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gible or intangible property.6 5 No two categories are mutually
exclusive and a plaintiff may recover all three types of damage pro-
vided sufficient evidence is introduced to support the allegations. 6
However, this traditional rule has not been adhered to when a Sec-
tion 367 violation has been involved. In the name of refusing to
award speculative damages,68 the judiciary has for the most part
limited recovery by a plaintiff who is involved in a tie-in to the
difference between what he paid for the tied product and what the
product was actually selling for on the open market.6 9
The first statement of this measure of recovery came in Chat-
tanooga Foundry and Pipe Works v. Atlanta.70 As a result of
an illegal combination of pipe manufacturers the City of Atlanta
was forced to buy pipe for its system of waterworks at a price above
what was reasonable or what the pipe was worth. Mr. Justice
Holmes speaking for the majority stated that because the city was
forced to pay more than it should have it was injured in its prop-
erty as required by Section 7 of the Sherman Act.71 As a result the
proper measure of damage was the difference in price trebled be-
tween what the city paid for the pipe and, "the market or fair price
that the city would have had to pay under natural conditions had
the illegal combination not been in existence.
'7 2
man Act violation); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957) (Sherman and Clayton Act violations);
Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924) (Sherman
Act violation); Muskin Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 167 F.
Supp. 106 (D. Md. 1958) (Sherman Act violation); United States Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 F. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) (Sherman Act
violation).
65. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555 (1931) (Sherman Act violation).
66. Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 226 F. Supp. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 202 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
68. Courts have been practically unanimous in indicating that prov-
ing damages in antitrust cases is rarely susceptible to the kind of concrete
and detailed proof that is available in other contexts. Therefore a tradi-
tional statement of the speculative damage rule is, "although the fact finder
is not entitled to base a judgment on speculation or guesswork, 'the jury
may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on the rele-
vant data and render its verdict accordingly.'" Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969). This rule is vague enough
so that the courts can generally expand or contract its application as they
see fit.
69. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text infra.
70. 203 U.S. 391 (1906).
71. This injury to property has now been incorporated in Section 4
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
72. 203 U.S. 3Dl, 396 (1906). See Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-
Taenzer Co., 265 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918).
This measure of recovery was picked up almost immediately
by the lower courts73 and found its first application in a sale of
goods context in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.74 Prior to
August 1913 the plaintiff was allowed to purchase record players
from Victor's distributors at 10% to 40% off the list price. After
August the defendant instituted a rather complicated licensing
agreement 75 which stated that any distributor who "assigned" the
machines for any price other than the one designated by Victor
would lose his distributorship. The effect of this was to force Straus
to pay full retail price for any machine that it planned to re-sell
in its own store.
In upholding the plaintiff's claim of antitrust violation the court
indicated that the plaintiff was damaged because he was unable to
exercise his rights to purchase goods in a free market.76 As a re-
sult the court indicated that Straus did not have to sue for lost
profits and risk no recovery at all,77 but instead, could recover the
difference between "the established reasonable price and the
amounts plaintiffs were compelled to pay .... ,,78 There was no
indication by the court in this context that these damages were
mutually exclusive.
However, in dealing with tie-ins litigation the judiciary has
almost uniformly indicated that the only allowable measure of re-
covery is the amount of the overcharge.7 9 Although overcharge
has been the basic measure of recovery, the amount of the over-
charge falls into two categories: (1) the difference between the
price paid for the tied product and the price at which comparable
products were available; 0 (2) where no payment has been exacted
73. United States Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 163 F. 701
(S.D.N.Y. 1908).
74. 397 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924). An attempt might be made to distin-
guish this case on the ground that the actual damage the court is allowing
is the cost of obtaining goods elsewhere because of the refusal to deal.
This is actually no more than overcharge with a different name.
75. The court described this licensing agreement as follows:
It was provided in this 'license agreement' that licensed dealers
were by its terms permitted to use the Victor instrument only for
demonstrating purposes and were empowered to assign the right
to the public 'upon payment of the full list royalty or license fee' as
fixed by Victor Company from time to time, and it was also pro-
vided that no 'license' should be assigned by distributors 'to a dealer
at less than the dealer's license royalty, or by any dealer to a user
or any other party at less than the full list royalty,' and the dis-
tributors could only license to a dealer approved by Victor Com-
pany.
Id. at 794. By this system the defendant attempted to retain title to all
patented machines and records thereafter shipped to distributors and to
license the use of them for the term of its patent having the longest time
to run.
76. 297 F. 791, 802-03 (2d Cir. 1924).
77. Id. at 803.
78. Id.
79. See notes 63-69 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 83 and accompanying text infra. There is another varia-
tion of this traditional method which measures the amount of the over-
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for the tying product, the excess over the fair market value of both
the tying and tied product."' The following discussion will demon-
strate how each variation has been used.
The traditional measure of overcharge as expressed by Mr.
Justice Holmes8 2 was applied most recently in Gray v. Shell Oil
Company.s8 Plaintiffs were operators of service stations leased
from defendant oil company. The court found the evidence suf-
ficient to show that the defendant imposed upon its dealers a sys-
tem of tying arrangements applicable to petroleum products and
tires, batteries and automotive accessories (TBA) which Shell sold
or sponsored. The plaintiffs claimed that Shell received a commis-
sion from these companies on all sales made to plaintiff operators.
They contended that the amount of these commissions trebled
(which, although not mentioned, it would be safe to assume would
have been greater than treble the amount of the overcharge) should
be the damages recoverable. 84 Although the court declared the
plaintiffs had failed to prove any injury stemming from the al-
leged antitrust violation under Section 3 of the Clayton Act"5 it
also stated, "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the appellants injury
and damage, if any, would be the difference between the price they
paid for the TBA merchandise and what they might have been
compelled to pay for comparable goods."'8 6
A similar result was reached in the Second Circuit in 1953. T
Plaintiff (franchisee) alleged that as a necessary prerequisite to
charge as the difference between the price paid for the tied product and the
price at which this product would have been bought if sold free of the ty-
ing arrangement. The primary difference between these two methods in
determining the amount of the overcharge is evidentiary. Under the first
method, the plaintiff will introduce evidence to indicate what products
similar to the tied product are selling for on the open market. (In Gray v.
Shell Oil Company, 469 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1972) where the court con-
cluded that, since the plaintiffs had introduced no evidence showing what
comparable products were selling for, they had failed to produce evidence
of injury or damage sufficient to go to the jury on this issue). Under
method two, the plaintiff's evidence will demonstrate what the tied product
itself would sell for if it was available free of the tying arrangement.
Cf., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
81. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
82. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
83. 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972). Appeal to Supreme Court pending.
84. Id. at 751.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
86. Gray v. Shell Oil Company, 469 F.2d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 1972).
This result is somewhat surprising since the Ninth Circuit is one of the two
circuits that has allowed something other than mere overcharge in tie-in
cases. See notes 99 and 115 and accompanying text infra.
87. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.
1953).
obtaining defendant's (franchisor) washing machines for its coin
operated laundries it had to agree to purchase additional equip-
ment such as meters and clocks from the franchisor as well. Al-
though the court found that neither the Sherman"" nor Clayton
8 9
Acts had been violated it stated that had such violation been
proved the actual damages flowing from that violation might well
include the additional amount which the franchisees were re-
quired to pay as a result of the tying arrangement.8 0
To date there has been only one case, Siegal v. Chicken
Delight, Inc.01 in which the second measure of determining over-
charge92 has been applied. The plaintiffs stated in their complaint
that as a condition to their obtaining a license to operate a Chicken
Delight Franchise and use its registered trademark they were re-
quired to buy from the franchisor cookers, fryers and certain mix
preparations. This practice was alleged to be an illegal tying ar-
rangement in violation of the Sherman Act 9 3 As a result of this
arrangement. the n1nintiff ri eclared they were damaged in the
amount of the difference between what they had to pay for the
tied products and the price at which those products could have
been purchased in the open market.
The defendants contended that even if an illegal tie-in was
found to exist the simple overcharge theory of damages should
not be applied in this case. Chicken Delight argued that since the
franchisees were not required to pay any franchise fees or royalty
payments the overcharge should be offset by a "reasonable value '
9 4
assessed for the Chicken Delight license.
The district court determined that an illegal tie-in did exist
and it rejected the defendant's contention that the amount of the
overcharge should be offset by the reasonable value of the license.
It stated:
This Court will not attempt to restructure the system of
defendants into one which is legally constituted and then
allow an offset for imaginary or suppositious royalty fees.
88. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
90. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 334 (2d
Cir. 1953). Accord, Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Corp., 324 F.2d 566 (4th
Cir. 1963). Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1964),
where it is stated, "the evidence showed how much more some items of
sponsored TBA cost than competitive brands and the quantity of the former
Lessig purchased .... This was relevant data from which the jury
could have made a just and reasonable estimate of damage."
91. 311 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd in part, and rev'd and
remanded for limited new trial, 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972).
92. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).




Such would be directly contrary to the avowed policy of
the Sherman Act.9 5
On appeal, the circuit court upheld the district court's find-
ing of an illegal tie-in but reversed and remanded for a new com-
putation of damages.9 6 In affirming the defendant's contention
that the overcharge should be offset by the reasonable value of the
license the court declared:
It is by no means clear that any of the parties to the
tying arrangement understood that the tying items were to
be given free of charge. Indeed, the more reasonable read-
ing of the contracts and of Chicken Delight's representa-
tions is that they stated simply that the contract price
for the tied items were to be the full compensation asked
by Chicken Delight for both those items and the franchise
* licenses.
By its own terms, Clayton Act recovery is only avail-
able where actual injury has been suffered.9 7 (citation
omitted). The question here is whether the plaintiffs have
suffered injury by virtue of the unlawful arrangement to
which they were subjected. That arrangement of necessity
involved both the tying and tied products. To ascertain
whether an unlawful arrangement for the sale of products
has caused the injury the cost or value of the products in-
volved free from the unlawful arrangement must be ascer-
tained.
9 8
Thus, upon retrial, only if the jury found that the amount of the
overcharge was greater than the reasonable value of the franchise
license would the plaintiffs be allowed to recover.
B. Damages Other Than Overcharge: Recovery of Anticipated
Profits
The first break in this strict application of the overcharge
theory in tie-in litigation came in 1963 in the case of Osborn v.
Sinclair Refining Corporation.9 The plaintiff, an operator of a Sin-
clair station, declared in his complaint that his lease was cancelled
by the defendant as a result of his reluctance to purchase prod-
ucts from companies that Sinclair recommended. The plaintiff
claimed as damages the difference in overcharge for the tied prod-
uct and the loss of one year's anticipated profits as a result of the
95. Id. at 852.
96. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
97. See notes 40-58 and accompanying text supra.
98. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1971).
99. 207 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md. 1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
refusal to deal. 10 The district court concluded'' that the plain-
tiff would be allowed to recover damages stemming from the over-
charge but would be denied loss of anticipated profits.102
The court based its disallowance of the second measure of re-
covery on the single trader rule first enunciated in United States
v. Colgate.0 3 It declared that since the refusal to deal was not done
in concert with others as part of a conspiracy, 04 or in furtherance
of a monopoly, 10 5 and was not per se unreasonable, there could be
no recovery for the termination of this business relationship.
The circuit court of appeals 0 6 reversed and flatly stated
that the lower court had misapplied the single trader rule.10 7 The
appeals court declared that under Section 4 of the Clayton Act' 0 8
once it is established that an unreasonable restraint of trade exists,
the question is no longer one of reasonableness or monoply but
merely one of causation: "It is as the statute plainly says, sim-
ply whether the injury was caused by something made unlawful
by the antitrust laws.' ' 10 9
The court expanded on the concept of injury set forth in the
Clayton Act 10 and indicated that, "[in many, if not most, private
antitrust actions the principal element of damage is precisely what
we are now considering-the loss of profits caused by a refusal to
deal.""'1  Therefore, the conclusion reached by the court, was:
100. 207 F. Supp. 856, 858 (D. Md. 1962).
101. This case had been in the district court once before, 171 F. Supp.
37 (1959), where the court held that an illegal tying arrangement did not
exist. The circuit court, 286 F.2d 832 (1960), reversed and found an illegal
tying arrangement to exist. They remanded for a computation of damages.
Certiorari was denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961), and the case went back to the
district court only on the damages question.
102. The plaintiff claimed and the court found that he suffered a
$12,000 loss in anticipated profits as a result of this refusal to deal.
103. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The single trader rule as announced by the
Supreme Court was:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to ex-
ercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the cir-
cumstances under which he will refuse to sell. 'The trader or
manufacturer, on the other hand, carries on an entirely private
business and can sell to whom he pleases.'
Id. at 307. This rule was later interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean
that if a seller merely announces a restrictive trade policy and then re-
fuses to sell to those who decline to abide by that policy no antitrust viola-
tion has been committed. However, if the seller does more, if he engages
in actions beyond the, "mere announcement of the policy . . . and he em-
ploys other means which affect adherence ... ,." he is violating the antitrust
laws. United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960).
104. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
105. Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo Materials, 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
106. 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
107. Id. at 573-75.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
109. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
111. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 324 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963).
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There is no justification in antitrust law . . . for limiting
recovery to losses sustained before the breach in business
relations. Where the customer is cut off in a coercive at-
tempt to further a forbidden arrangement for a 'fenced
off market,' he is entitled to recover all damages issuing
from that punitive action. To deny him this would evis-
cerate section 4112 (emphasis added).
Because the district court's finding as to the damages stemming
from the refusal to deal were not clearly erroneous the plaintiff
was allowed to recover the $12,000 (trebled) in anticipated profits
that he claimed to have lost in addition to the amount of the over-
charge.113
It is important to note the court's language that "all" dam-
ages accruing from the violation are recoverable. This is a signifi-
cant break with previous tie-in litigation. The district court, fol-
lowing tradition, had asserted that when the antitrust violation in-
volved a tying arrangement the injury and therefore the damage
recoverable was determined by the amount of the overcharge. The
circuit court rejected this doctrine, at least in the situation where
the plaintiff was forced out of business as a result of his refusal
to comply with the tying arrangement even though some over-
charge damage had been suffered. It would not take a fundament-
al leap of logic to extend the proposition set forth by the circuit
court and allow the plaintiff involved in an illegal tying arrange-
ment to recover "all" damages suffered, including the amount of
the overcharge, as a result of the antitrust violation regardless of
whether or not the plaintiff is actually forced out of business.
114
This recovery of anticipated future profits for refusal to deal
was announced one year later in the Ninth Circuit in Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Company."" The plaintiff claimed that his lease
was cancelled because of his refusal to sell gasoline at the com-
pany's "suggested" retail price. In addition he declared that the
defendant required Tidewater dealers to buy TBA from certain spe-
cified companies at higher than normal prices. Refusal to comply
resulted in a threat by the defendant to cancel the offending deal-
er's lease. Two items of damage were sought: loss of reasonably
anticipated future profits because of the illegal termination of his
lease, and the amount of the overcharge that the plaintiff was
forced to pay due to the existence of the tying arrangement.
The appellate court found that both the termination of the
112. Id. at 573.
113. The district court had determined the overcharge to be $325.
114. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
115. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
lease and the tying arrangement violated the antitrust laws and that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain both damage recoveries.
The court, however, made one additional comment regarding the
tying arrangement:
Lessig did not contend that the alleged exclusive dealing
and tying arrangements led to the cancellation of his lease;
and we agree with Tidewater that there is little evidence
that Lessig was damaged prior to the termination of his
lease by the requirement that he purchase petroleum
products exclusively from Tidewater. 16
The clear implication of that statement is that if any damage prior
to the termination of the lease in addition to the amount of the
overcharge was sufficiently proven the court would not hesitate
to allow the plaintiff to recover that additional damage. However,
the Ninth Circuit has not acted in accordance with the implication
contained in this language in all cases. When faced with an ordi-
nary tie-in violation the court has limited recovery to the amount
of the overcharge.
117
It is significant that this liberalization of damages has occurred
only in cases where the injured party has actually been driven out
of business as a result of the tying arrangement. In not one case
where the plaintiff was the operator of a going business was he al-
lowed to recover more than the amount of the overcharge. There
is no explanation for this relatively limited measure of damages.
The argument might be made that trebling the amount of the
overcharge is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for all of his
losses. However, this argument misses the primary reason for
the existence of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.118 This trebel dam-
age provision was designed to encourage private parties to bring
suit" O so as to help the government police antitrust violators.
This provision was not meant to encourage the judiciary to de-
velop only one measure of recovery and then treble it, thereby sup-
planting all other types of recovery for injuries suffered as a re-
sult of the violation.
120
116. Id. at 471. The Court continued however, that the evidence was
sufficient to show that Lessig was paying more than he should have for
the TBA.
117. See note 86 supra.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
119. It is for this reason that several courts have not allowed the plain-
tiff to recover additional punitive damages or interest. These courts have
felt that allowing the plaintiff to treble his actual amount of damages pro-
vided the necessary incentive and takes care of these other two punitive as-
pects more than adequately.
Punitive Damages: Stanton v. Texas Co., 294 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1957);
Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co., 16 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
Logic. Treble the amount of the actual damages carries its own symbol of
punishment.
Interest: Locklin Radiant Color Co. v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873
(7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971); Eastern Fireproofing
Co., Inc. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 50 F.R.D. 140 (D. Arizona 1970).
120. One court stated the policy of the treble damage provision as
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The logic of this position becomes abundantly clear when a re-
examination is made of the types of damages held to be recover-
able for other violations of the antitrust laws.12' Since, as is
stated,12 2 none of the categories are mutually exclusive an injured
party should be able to recover some, if not all, of these damages
no matter what type of violation actually caused the injury.
Certainly proving lost profits12' or damage to good will 124 is no
more difficult when the antitrust violation falls under Section
3125 of the Clayton Act rather than Section 2 (a).126 If the policy' 2 7
of Section 4128 is not to be "eviscerated," as long as the fact of injury
is present, the plaintiff litigating an illegal tie-in should be able
to recover whatever damages he can prove with reasonable cer-
tainty 2 9 and not be limited merely to the amount of the overcharge.
C. The Defense of Passing On
Recently the courts have taken an oblique step in implement-
ing this philosophy. For years, the primary defense of a corpora-
tion which was sued for an antitrust violation was that of passing
on. If the defendant could prove that the plaintiff had passed on
to a third party the extra cost of doing business that resulted from
the antitrust violation, the plaintiff was denied all recovery. The
first rejection of this theory came in 1918 in the case of Southern
follows:
The private antitrust action is an important and effective method
of combatting unlawful and destructive business practices. The
private suitor compliments the Government in enforcing the anti-
trust laws. The treble damage provision was designed to foster
and stimulate the interest of private persons in maintaining a free
and competitive economy. Its efficacy should not be weakened by
judicial construction.
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957).
121. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
122. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 148-57 and accompanying text infra.
124. The factors to be considered when determining damage to good-
will as the result of an antitrust violation are:
(1) What profit has the business made over and above an amount
fairly attributable to the return on the capital investment and to
the labor of the owner?
(2) What is the reasonable prospect that this additional profit
will continue into the future considering all circumstances ex-
isting and known as of the date of the valuation?
Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 219 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 975 (1958).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1970). Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination
Act.
127. See note 120 supra.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
129. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taener Lumber Co.130 The case concerned
excessive railroad freight charges. The defendants claimed that
the plaintiffs had suffered no damage because the excessive costs
were passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices for
lumber. Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Court stated that:
[T] he general tendency of the law in regard to damages at
least, is not to go beyond the first step. As it does not
attribute remote consequences to a defendant so it holds
him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered loss.
The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the verdict
when they paid [the overcharge]. The carrier ought not
to be allowed to retain his illegal profit and the only one
that can take it from him is the one that alone was within
relation with him and from whom the carrier took the
sum.1 3 1
Despite this strong position the rationale was never carried over
into antitrust law and the doctrine retained an amazing amount of
vitality.
It was not until 1968 in Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach-
inery Corp.1 2 that the doctrine was finally put to rest in antitrust
litigation. The defendant was found to have violated Section 2 of
the Sherman Act"'3 by engaging in a policy of only leasing its ma-
chinery and refusing to sell the equipment outright to shoe manu-
facturing concerns. In attempting to avoid liability for damages,
United stated that the increased cost of doing business accruing to
Hanover from this illegal practice was passed on to the plaintiff's
customers. The Court firmly rejected this defense and stated that
the injured party was entitled to recover treble damages, (1) if he
absorbs the loss, (2) if he maintains his own price but takes steps
to increase his volume or decrease other costs, or (3) if he raises
his prices." 4  Mr. Justice White speaking for the Court stated:
As long as the seller continues to charge the illegal price,
he takes from the buyer more than the law allows. At
whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller
remains illegally high and his profits would be greater were
his costs lower.
135
In essence the Court stated that were the defense allowed, only
the ultimate consumers who absorbed the overcharge would be able
to bring suit. But since their interests in the litigation would
amount to no more than several pairs of shoes no litigation would
be likely to develop. As a result:
Those who violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or
monopolizing would retain the fruits of their illegality
130. 245 U.S. 531 (1918).
131. Id. at 533-34.
132. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
134. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
489 (1970).
135. Id. at 489.
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because no one would be able to bring suit against them.
Treble damage actions, the importance of which the
Court has many times emphasized would be substantially
reduced in effectiveness.
13
The Court's decision is important in several respects. First, it
prevents antitrust violators from escaping liability by asserting
the artificial defense of passing on. Second, and more importantly
the Court is allowing recovery despite the fact that the plaintiffs
may not be technically bearing the loss. The policy stated in this
decision is to increase the effectiveness of private antitrust litiga-
tion by, (a) allowing the plaintiff to recover whatever damages he
can prove and, (b) by not inhibiting the injured person with strict
rules concerning the amount and type of recovery.
1 7
Four factors augur well for increased liberalization in the meas-
ure of damages a plaintiff involved in an illegal tie-in may recover.
First, there appears to be no reason why the traditional measure
of damages applied to other antitrust violations 3 8 are not equally
applicable to Section 3139 violations. Secondly, the small steps
taken in Osborn140 and Lessig'4 ' would indicate that the courts are
beginning to realize that overcharge is only one element of com-
pensable damages in tie-in cases. Thirdly, is the action by the Su-
preme Court in Hanover Shoe 42 and its stated policy of encourag-
ing private enforcement suits to make them a vital element in anti-
trust litigation. This Supreme Court mandate should encourage
courts to liberalize damage rules in tie-in litigation and allow the
plaintiff to recover whatever damages he can prove. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, is the fact that no court has ever stated
that other types of damages are not recoverable. 143 Coupled with
the other three, this factor provides a powerful impetus for the
courts to expand their heretofore limited measure of recovery in
cases that involve tying arrangements.
D. Measure of Recovery for Those Excluded from the Market as
Result of the Tying Arrangement
The most commonly alleged injury by this group of litigants
136. Id. at 494.
137. Id. at 493-94.
138. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
140. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
141. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
142. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
143. In all the cases that have been discussed so far not one has indi-
cated or even hinted that a plaintiff may not receive something other than
overcharge.
as a result of an illegal tying arrangement is lost profits. 144 The
courts have been quite lenient in determining what proof a plaintiff
may use to demonstrate that his profits have been diminished.145
In addition, consistent with the statement that several types of
damage recoveries are allowable under Clayton Section 4,146 injured
plaintiffs have been able to recoup a variety of losses caused by
the antitrust violation.
14 7
Traditionally, lost profits as a result of antitrust violations has
been measured in two different ways.148 Both methods were
developed in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures.149 The plaintiff,
an independent theatre operator alleged that RKO was engaged in
a conspiracy that prevented him from obtaining films for exhibi-
tion until other, preferred operators, had shown them in earlier
more desirable runs. As a result, he contended his profits suffered
a sharp loss.
The plaintiff sought recovery on two theories. He introduced
evidence which tended to show that his net profits before the anti-
trust violation were higher than during the period when the anti-
trust violation was in existence. Therefore, under this theory the
plaintiff was demanding the difference between the net profits be-
fore the violation and the net profits that were recorded during the
violation. 150 In addition, the plaintiff also offered evidence which in-
dicated that his net receipts were approximately $115,000 less during
the period of the violation than those of a preferred exhibitor
whose theatre was comparable in size but inferior in its location
and physical appointments.15 The Court held each class of evidence
offered was sufficient to show lost profits but that the classes were
not mutually exclusive. The plaintiff was allowed to recover his
net loss in admission receipts.152
144. The Supreme Court in one case and several circuit courts have
held that the damages recoverable under Section 4 of the Clayton Act are
net rather than gross profits. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan,
Inc., 406 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1969); Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915 (1955)'; Peter v. Union Oil Co., 328
F. Supp. 998 (C.D. Cal. 1971); 2361 State Corp. v. Sealy, Inc., 263 F. Supp.
845 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Siegfried v. Kansas City Star Co., 193 F. Supp. 427
(W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 819
(1962); Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Products Co., 114 F. Supp. 129 (D.C.N.J.
1953).
145. See notes 148-57 and accompanying text infra.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See note 63-65 and accompanying text
supra.
147. See note 158 and accompanying text infra.
148. See notes 150 and 151 and accompanying text infra.
149. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
150. This theory of recovery has been categorized as the before and
after test.
151. This theory of recovery has been categorized as the yardstick test.
152. The usual types of evidence offered by the plaintiff to support
these claims are: (1) Business records by the plaintiff before the conspir-
acy arose; (2) Business records of comparative but unrestrained enter-
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Recently, a number of courts15 3 have employed a third measure
of recovery called sales projection to determine lost profits. This
method was employed by the court in Karseal v. Richfield Oil
Corp.15 4 which involved a Section 3155 violation. To establish the
amount of damages recoverable the plaintiff offered proof that its
product Wax Seal sold 3 to 7 times better on the open market
than did Mac's, the product which the defendant forced its
stations to purchase. The plaintiff then offered evidence which
demonstrated that Richfield bought 4,707 cases of Mac's polish dur-
ing the years when the violation was in existence. Karseal claimed
that the jury could infer that Wax Seal outsold Mac's 3 to 1. Thus,
had plaintiff been allowed access to defendant's 3,000 stations ap-
proximately 19,000 cases of Wax Seal would have been sold at
Richfield stations during the years in question. It also offered
proof that during the period of the antitrust violation its profit on
a case of Wax Seal was 570 per case.156
The court experienced no difficulty in allowing Karseal to
prove lost profits with this rather unique approach. It commented
that a plaintiff was not expected to prove loss stemming from an
antitrust violation with mathematical certainty and it analogized:
[W] e do not see much difference between the suggested
formula as an assist in arriving at just and reasonable
damages, and a chart placed on a blackboard in a personal
injury case, where plaintiff's lawyer outlines his computa-
tions as to loss of earnings, pain and suffering and the var-
ious other items of damage.1
57
Why this rather cavalier attitude toward proving damage should
prevail when dealing with this second cateogry of injured plain-
tiffs as opposed to the first is a problem that the courts have never
attempted to address, let alone answer.
That lost profits is not the only measure of damages that can or
should be awarded by courts dealing with tie-in violations is amply
demonstrated by Advance Business Systems and Supply Co. v.
prises during the particular period in question; (3) Expert opinion based
on items (1) or (2). Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 393 (9th Cir.
1957).
153. Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.
1966); North Texas Producers Association v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,
198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Bowl America,
Inc. v. Fair Lanes, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969).
154. 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
156. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir.
1959).
157. Id. at 714.
SCM Corporation.'5 8 SCM had an involved series of tying ar-
rangements which required that any person using their photocopy-
ing equipment also had to use SCM paper. 159 As a result plaintiff
was unable to sell competing types of paper to those customers
who had SCM equipment.
The plaintiff claimed four measures of damage: (1) the cost
of maintaining a service department; 160 (2) the time spent by
plaintiff's president in servicing and mollifying plaintiff's custo-
mers because of SCM's threats and other restrictive practices which
could have been spent in other work profitable to the plaintiff;
(3) loss of sales; (4) lost rentals on machines "cannibalized" to pro-
vide parts used in service to plaintiff's customers.' 6' Items three
and four were disallowed by the court because it found that neither
SCM's service nor parts policy involved an illegal tying arrange-
ment.
62
On appeal the circuit court' 63 affirmed the findings of the dis-
trict court but in addition indicated that the cancellation clause
contained in the service contract'6 4 constituted an illegal tying ar-
rangement. Thus the plaintiff was able to recover for the specific
sales it lost as a result of this cancellation clause.
The importance of this case does not lie in merely listing the
damages that the plaintiff was able to recover but rather in demon-
strating the court's attitude in allowing this diversified recovery.
The appeals court did not engage in any long discussion attempting
to confine certain types of damage recoveries to specific situations,
but merely found that the award of the district court was not
"clearly erroneous." If this attitude were to prevail throughout
the entire area of tie-in violations, plaintiffs would be encouraged
to bring more antitrust litigation, thus making private enforcement
suits an even more effective means of controlling big business.
158. 287 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Okla. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 55 (1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
159. The tying arrangements found to exist were:
(1) SCM tied the sale of its paper to its service agreement. In its agree-
ment SCM undertook on the basis of a single annual charge, to provide an
unlimited number of service calls during the duration of the agreement, to
make regular inspections and to replace certain defective parts free of
charge. However, if SCM found that its customers were using other than
SCM paper it reserved the right to cancel the agreement at any time.
(2) SCM leased its Model 55 Copier on a copy service basis which
meant there was a charge for each use of the machine and this charge
included paper and toner which were supplied by SCM as needed. The
Model 55 was eventually offered for sale without these restrictions but it
was never leased on other than a copy service basis.
160. Since SCM refused to service those machines using competitors
paper the plaintiff was forced, if he wanted to retain his customers who
used SCM machines, to maintain a service department.
161. Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287 F.
Supp. 143, 158 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
162. Id. at 157 and 158.
163. 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969).
164. See note 159 supra.
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Finally, one other type of damage, lost investment, has been
awarded by a court 6 5 to a corporation damaged as a result of an
illegal tying arrangement. The essence of this type of recovery
is out-of-pocket expense. In this case, plaintiff Wescoast, alleged
that as a result of an illegal tying arrangement it was unable to
complete construction of a cable television installation. The plain-
tiff claimed that the tying arrangement was designed not to make
them buy the tied product but to keep them completely out of the
cable television market. As a result of this arrangement, Wescoast
was forced to sell out for far less than the business was worth.
In the suit for damages plaintiff introduced evidence which
indicated its net investment in the business. Even though there
was other evidence to show that the fair market value of the busi-
ness was above this net investment figure the court deemed the
measure of recovery to be the difference between the net invest-
ment of Wescoast and the sale price it had received from the de-
fendant. The plaintiff did not make a strong argument that the
measure of recovery should be the difference between the fair mar-
ket value and the sale price. The court was not afforded the oppor-
tunity to comment on this aspect of the case since the defendant
had, on appeal, contended that plaintiff's evidence was insuffi-
cient to sustain any recovery. It is an open question that, if the
plaintiff had appealed on the grounds of an insufficient damage
recovery, the court would have awarded more than mere out-of-
pocket expense.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that a plaintiff involved in an antitrust suit under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act 166 or Section 1 of the Sherman Act
167
must meet considerable court created obstacles in pursuing pri-
vate enforcement litigation. On the one hand, the courts have
liberalized the requirements necessary to prove an illegal tying
arrangement 68 but they still seem to adhere to a strict set of stand-
ing rules.' 69 Although espousing a policy to encourage private anti-
trust litigation, 70 the courts continue to severely limit the damages
recoverable by plaintiffs involved in illegal tying arrangements. It
165. Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d
653 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
168. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
169. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
170. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
is to be hoped that the courts will eventually resolve these discrep-
ancies and unite to strengthen private enforcement litigation.
As was indicated throughout this article there appears to be
no reason why plaintiffs who are actually involved in an illegal tie-
in should be limited to a damage recovery measured solely by the
amount of the overcharge. If the courts are to remain consistent
with the types of damages awarded in other antitrust litigation,
171
the plaintiff should be allowed to recover whatever damages he can
prove resulted from the illegal tying arrangement. The decisions
in Osbornq72 and Lessigx73 evince a trend in this direction.
As for plaintiffs damaged by market exclusion, the courts have
now adopted the attitude that the plaintiff can and will be allowed
to recover whatever damages he can prove. The decision in Advance
Business17 4 should stand as a model for all courts dealing with this
area of tie-in litigation. With the continued expansion of big busi-
ness the liberal attitude displayed by this case provides encourage-
ment for the continued and expanding vitality of private antitrust
enforcement as a method of curbing excesses of the business com-
munity.
GREGORY J. BLASI
171. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
172. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Corp., 207 F. Supp. 856 (D. Md.
1962), rev'd, 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963). See note 99 and accompanying
text supra.
173. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964). See
note 115 and accompanying text supra.
174. 287 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Okla. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 55 (1969).
See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
